Amos’s Oracles against the Nations: A Study of Amos

Barton, John. Amos’s Oracles against the Nations: A Study of Amos 1.3--2.5. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Pp 1 + 61. ISBN: 978-0521104081. $36.00 paperback.
In this short monograph John Barton provides an interpretation of Amos’ “Oracles Against the Nations” (OANs) in Amos 1:3-2:3. The purpose of Barton’s monograph is to explain why the prophet Amos condemns the foreign nations (p. 2). Barton’s conclusion is stated from the outset, namely that these OANs function in their literary context to lull the audience of Israel into hearty agreement with the prophet as he denounces foreign nations for their atrocities in war. Barton argues that Amos condemns these nations by appealing to international norms and does not believe that Amos condemns the nations for their treatment of Israel (p. 7). For Barton, the move Amos makes in 2:6 is pivotal. The prophet purposefully juxtaposes crimes committed by the nations with condemnation of Israel’s sins, a shocking rhetorical move (p. 3). Barton organizes his argument into the following sections to prove his thesis: a discussion of the form-critical issues and the provenance of the oracles (ch. 2); the authenticity of the oracles (ch. 3); possible events which relate to the atrocities condemned by the prophets (ch. 4); the literary effect of the juxtaposition of these atrocities with Israel’s transgressions (ch. 5); the basis for Yahweh’s judgement of these nations (ch. 6). Barton ends with an overview of international conventions in war of the ancient Near East.
In the introduction, Barton summarizes what he believes to be the mentality of Israel according to Amos (p. 4):
- Sin calls down divine punishment.
- National agents are responsible for conduct.
- Israel is privileged and is immune from punishment.
- Amos’ hearers did not expect judgement from prophets.
- Israel did not understand social sins to be on par with national crimes.
- The sins of the nations were more obvious than the sins of Israel.
- The people expected prophets to denounce foreign nations and not them (a later addition, p. 5).
After listing these beliefs, Barton states that it impossible to prove these correct. It is only important that Amos thought them to be correct for Amos 1-2 to be intelligent. This is key for the author as his thesis is that 2:6 comes as a surprise for the Israelite audience. This section of the monograph would benefit from more evidence to support the above reconstruction.
In chapter two, Barton interacts with form criticism and the possible origins for the OAN’s genre in Amos. Three categories for understanding the provenance of these oracles are discussed following the arguments expounded by R.E. Clements, N.K. Gottwald, and J.H. Hayes, whom he engages throughout the monograph. The first of these is the proposed background of Holy War. These oracles are thus understood in the context of prophetic pronouncements against enemies connected to battle (p. 8). Barton pushes back on this portrayal following Fohrer’s objection that form alone cannot explain Amos’ use of them (p. 9). The second category discussed by Barton understands Amos as a cult prophet of victory, citing Ps 20, 21, and 60 where the opening of the Psalm contains a lament of military defeat and the second half of the Psalm transitions to assurance of victory (p. 10). In this framework, the cult prophet intervenes in a liturgical pronouncement in the transition of these Psalms by denouncing Israel’s enemies (p. 11). Barton views this as a possibility, and particularly so with Ps 60:6-8, which contains Moab, Edom, and Philistia. These nations are also censured in Amos 1-2. Barton’s critique of this view highlights the fact that priests, and not prophets, make liturgical pronouncements; and that Amos 1-2 is not concerned with Israel’s avenging her enemies. The action rests with God as he is concerned to repay these nations (p. 12). Barton discusses a third and final category tied to the cult, which links Amos to cultic festival in the context of Israel’s covenant with Yahweh (p. 12). Here, foreigners (in general) are condemned ritually and systematically (p. 12). Barton critiques this view, stating that there is little biblical evidence for this type of scene while noting it is difficult to definitively link Israel’s cult and her prophets. He is, however, open to a shared genre common between nations which condemn foreigners. An example of this are the frequently discussed Egyptian Execration texts, put forward by A. Bentzen and subscribed to by Hayes and Gottwald. These texts call down judgement on Pharaoh’s enemies in a geographical pattern: southern-northern-western-Egyptian individuals. Many scholars reject direct dependence by Amos on these Execration texts based on time and geography but understand this as part of a pattern in the Levant.
Barton also rejects direct influence and notes (following Weiss) the challenge of drawing conclusions from the geographical pattern in the Execration Texts because nearly all Egyptian texts employ this pattern. However, Amos only deploys this technique in the context of judgement. Another distinction is that the Execration texts do not announce judgment on the nation of Egypt itself, only upon other nations. Conversely, the point (according to Barton) of the OANs in Amos is to condemn the nation of Israel (pp. 12-13). Barton views Amos’ repetitive judgement statements (“for three… for four…) to be an innovation from common didactic devices (Prov 30:18-19); and argues that the geographical pattern in Amos 1-2 is likely arbitrary. He concludes this chapter stating the there is no need to look for complex form-critical hypothesis in Amos 1-2 (p. 15). Evaluating Barton’s chapter, a strength is his engagement with form-critics. Form alone cannot explain Amos’ message. Barton’s conclusion about the geographical pattern in the passage requires more discussion. For example, many scholars have noted a crisscross geographical pattern concerning the nations in Amos 1-2, which serves to rhetorically encircle Israel. Barton does not engage with this argument.
In chapter three, Barton argues for the authenticity of many of the OANs. He provides a translation of Amos 1:3-2:5 in which the most significant comment in the textual notes is Barton’s translation of the repeated לֹ֣א אֲשִׁיבֶ֑נּוּ as “I will not rescind my decree” (p. 18). Interpreters differ on the referent for the third person suffix, lit. “I will not return it.” Barton documents a similar construction in Num 23:20b. The word’s main idea is that the judgement announced (presented in the perfect tense, “thus the Lord has said”) will not be revoked. As noted above, Barton argues for the authenticity of all oracles other than Edom, Tyre, and Judah. He dates Edom to the post-exilic period because it lacks elements present in other oracles such as כֹּ֚ה אָמַ֣ר יְהוָ֔ה and a specific punishment. Along with this, the עַל clause is expanded in the Edom oracle using finite verbs. Barton dates the Tyre oracle late as well due to its mention of covenant (וְלֹ֥א זָכְר֖וּ בְּרִ֥ית אַחִֽים), typically associated with the Priestly writer (Gen 9:15; Ex 2:24; Lev 26:42), and because the oracle repeats the punishment of Philistia (p. 22). Barton also believes the Judah oracle as a late addition based on the difference of its crime (having to do with the law). He comments, “It is hard to believe that Amos could not have found some more definite sin with which to charge Judah, and in any case the tone of general disapprobation for disobedience to law is quite out of keeping with the indictment of the other nations for the war crimes (foreign nations) and social injustice (Israel)” (p. 23). However, there are weaknesses in this line of reasoning. First, Barton’s thesis is that the nations are judged upon customary (although informal) ethics of the day. Thus, it seems that Amos would, in fact, denounce Judah according to their own customs, namely, the law of Yahweh (תּוֹרַ֣ת יְהוָ֗ה). Second, the variation between these supposedly later oracles raises important questions that go unanswered in Barton’s framework. Indeed, all three oracles do not receive the label of inauthentic by Barton based on “literary considerations,” but on a priori grounds that authenticity must mean grammatical and syntactical uniformity. The lack of uniformity is an important question in the text. These can be answered differently, however. As Barton recognizes, the Tyre and Edom oracles lack the final אָמַ֥ר יְהוָֽה. Contra Barton, instead of understanding these as unoriginal, a better option is to link the two nations as Amos does in 1:9. Further, some scholars come to opposite conclusions as Barton regarding the repetitive judgement found in the Gaza and Tyre oracles. Instead of dating the Tyre oracle as late, similar judgements may reveal similar crimes and could be evidence of a slave-trade relationship between Gaza, Tyre, and Edom. There is ample evidence for this northeast to southwest trade pattern in the Levant.
In chapter four, Barton engages with several scholars concerning the background of the atrocities committed by foreign nations. The traditional view locates these in the 850 BCE timeframe and onward as part of the Aramean Wars. Others, such as Clements, place them a century earlier as the Solomonic Empire disintegrated (p. 23). Wolff argues for a dating under Jeroboam II. Barton proceeds to discuss the interpretive difficulties of the timeline in 1-2 Kings, taking each oracle in turn. Some may take issue with certain aspects of Barton’s presentation of the material, but it exemplifies the challenges posed if one wishes to identify the exact historical circumstances behind Amos’ oracles. Barton ends the chapter concluding that certainty in these events is unlikely (p. 35).
Barton argues in chapter five for understanding Israel’s oracle as the climax of the OANs and provides a surprise for the Israelite hearers, who have been in hearty agreement until 2:6. He reasons that this makes best sense of the arrangement of the foreign nations first, with Israel’s condemnation second, following a pattern elsewhere in the book (3:2; 7:1-9; 9:7b). Scholars mentioned above who cite a cultic origin (autumn festival or holy war) for the oracles take issue with this, asserting that a second revision only occurred subsequent to Amos’ discovery of Yahweh’s judgement of Israel. In assessing this chapter, Barton is likely correct in his understanding of the arrangement of these oracles (in their current literary form) to surprise an Israelite audience. It makes the best sense of the arrangement of the oracles and repetition within the oracles which build to a dramatic climax in 2:6. Barton does not mention this, but it also makes the best sense for why Israel is included in the same formula as the other nations, and why no other formula is used after 2:6. Israel is the target for the remainder of the prophet’s address. An issue in this chapter is that Barton is not clear on whether he considers Judah as a foreign nation. The title would indicate that he does not, but if 2:6 is the transition to Israel, while everything prior serves to heighten the judgement by juxtaposition, how does the Judah oracle fit into organizing principle?
Here I review the appendix (ancient Near Eastern international customs) along with chapter six because Barton links them in his argument. Beginning in chapter six, Barton reviews explanations for Amos’ condemnation of the nations. On what grounds does the prophet condemn these atrocities? Barton arranges the suggested answers under four categories (p. 39):
- Nationalism and Covenant: The foreign nations oppose Israel and thus oppose Yahweh.
- Logical Explanation: Yahweh’s required morality of Israel is extended to the nations.
- Universal Law: All nations are subject to Yahweh’s divine law as he is ruler and creator of the universe.
- International Customary Law: The nations are censured for “infringing customs of accepted or believed to be accepted by all civilized nations” (p. 39).
Addressing the first item, Barton concluded that it is incorrect to associate Amos with the Israelite cult. If this is what is meant by nationalism, Barton does not find this convincing. Some scholars understand Amos’ oracles to connect to atrocities committed primarily against Israel. Barton deals with this understanding here as well. Citing the oracles concerning Philistia and Moab, Barton is unconvinced. He is in good company. It is a widely held view that the Moabite oracle does not reference Israel. Thus, any interpreter wishing to connect Israel to every oracle must account for the Moab oracle. The second item (“Logical Extension”) extends the morality of Israel (although not covenant) to the nations. Put differently, Yahweh applies the moral requirements of Israel’s covenant to the foreign nations. Barton recognizes the benefit of this view in that Israel retains its special place in covenant relationship to Yahweh and yet allows for the nations to be held accountable. However, Barton counters this by arguing that Amos’ oracles betray a different moral standard for God’s people and the nations, one that is much stricter for the former. This counter makes good sense because it accounts for the representative sins of the nations in the formula “for three… for four…” along with the specificity of Israel’s sins.
Understanding these oracles within the third framework of a universal law is also common. In this view, Amos condemns the nations based on God as the universal sovereign who asserts authority over all creation, not just Israel (p. 43). Although sympathetic to this, Barton does not agree that Yahweh would judge nations based on a law they were not aware of. In his view, this makes Amos irrational. (p. 43). The final view is espoused by Barton, that the prophet denounces the nations based on their infringement of universal moral norms. In his mind, this relieves the tensions of the previous category. Amos could not be so irrational as to condemn the nations for failing a standard of which they were not aware. So, Amos instead condemns them for “offenses against common humanity; not for disobedience to God, but for failing to follow the dictates of their own moral sense” (p. 44). Barton does not mean that there are international, legislated laws in the modern sense, but (quoting G.H. Jones) “an accepted norm of international behaviour in the ancient Near East, and that some actions would be regarded as atrocious against the background of a common ethos” (p. 44). Intriguingly, Barton at the same time stresses that it is unimportant for his argument if the nations were unaware of these international standards. He states that argument does not hinge on it. All that matters from his point of view is that the Israelites would have agreed with Amos to achieve the desired response leading into 2:6 (p. 45).
Barton’s explanation here runs aground on several points. First, in the appendix of his monograph Barton surveys ancient Near Eastern evidence which reveals there were ethical expectations between nations related to diplomacy, fugitive laws, and extreme violence (he admits Assyria is in its own category for praise of brutality). However, Barton fails to link Amos and these ANE examples. His chapter falls prey to an earlier point made in the monograph concerning form critical questions. Simply because there are examples of ethical expectations in the ANE does not prove Amos to be doing something similar. Second, Barton provides no example from the ancient Near East of one nation holding another nation accountable for its treatment of a third-partynation. However, Amos in his passage describes the sins of various nations many of which in Barton’s view have little to do with Israel. Third, Barton argues that it would be irrational for Amos to condemn the foreign nations based on a standard which they did not know and so rejects the idea of a universal standard; yet in his own argument he concedes that it is unimportant if the nations were in fact aware of these international customs, revealing an inconsistency in his analysis. Must these nations be aware of Yahweh’s standard? Barton’s answer is at the same time yes and no. What is the purpose of Amos’ rhetoric in light of the surveyed ancient Near Eastern background? The chapter leaves open the question is set out to answer, “What is the basis for Yahweh’s judgement of the nations?”
Barton’s conclusion of the monograph is a summary of points from his introduction. He provides his understanding of the popular belief in Israel by a mirror reading of Amos 1:3-2:3.
- Sin calls down divine punishment.
- National agents are responsible for conduct.
- Israel is privileged and is immune to punishment.
- Amos’ hearers did not expect judgement from a prophet.
- Israel did not understand their social sins to be on par with national crimes.
- It was less obvious to Israel that social sins were on par with national atrocities and these sins were “easily forgiven” (p. 48; this is stated differently than in the introduction and item seven is not repeated here).
Only if the interpreter takes for granted that Israel is the real target of the OANs will these beliefs make good sense so long as they remain “likely.” This is because we cannot read the mind of ancient Israelites. Barton’s best contributions come from this chapter as he seeks to describe the originality of Amos’ thought, which he believes to be Amos’ assertion that social injustices within Israel are on par with other more obvious crimes committed by the nations (p. 49). Second, he understands Amos to be original in understanding Israel to be all the more culpable, and not immune, to judgement because of their special status before Yahweh (p. 49).
In this monograph, Barton has argued that Amos uses OANs primarily to lull Israel to sleep with hearty agreement of their atrocities only to shock them in 2:6 by levelling judgement against the chosen nation. According to Barton, this agreement stems from an underlying ethic from international customary law. However possible it may be that an Israelite reader was surprised to hear condemnation in 2:6, Barton’s arguments would be more convincing with a thorough engagement with the literary features of the text. Based on the arguments provided here, I do not believe international customary law to be a convincing basis for Yahweh’s judgement of the nations in Amos 1-2. Overall, this monograph is important for its impact on Amos studies, tracing the origination of most oracles to the prophet, and engagement with possible ancient Near Eastern international customs as Yahweh’s basis for judging the nations.
Josh Tolman
ThM Student
Denver Seminary
August 2025